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Abstract
Piaget (1951) postulated tha t younger and older children's cognitive functioning is 
distinct. Whereas younger children are "behaviorists" (Shantz, 1983), attending to  
environmental cues and physical outcomes, older children are able to  consider 
realities abstract from the presenting physical milieu. Some recent research 
challenges the notion tha t younger children are bound by their physical perceptions 
(e.g., Graham & Weiner, 1991). The present study investigated the extent to 
which younger and older children are influenced by causal attributions and affective 
role-taking in their w illingness to help and in their reasonings for or against helping. 
N inety-four first-grade (47 females, 47 males) and sixty-nine fifth-grade (41 
females, 28 males) children participated. Younger children were found to  be 
"outcome-dependent" in their prosocial decisions, helping or not helping because 
either they perceived help to  be needed or they wanted to  continue in some other 
activ ity . In addition to  these considerations, older children exhibited some more 
abstract considerations in their helping decisions, such as distinguishing between 
causally controllable and uncontrollable situations and being more willing to  help 
after imagining how they would feel in the other's situation. The first- and fifth - 
grade children's reports of motivation for or against helping were found to  be 
d ifferent as well. Results are discussed w ith  regard to  the extent to  which they 
support and question the existence of d istinct social-cognitive skills w ith in  early and 
later childhood.
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Children's Decisions to  Help:
The Effects of Causal Controllability and A ffective  Role-taking 
In Piaget's (1951) cognitive developmental fram ework, the young child 's 
(i.e., 2-7-years-old) thought is permeated by "egocentrism ." This "preoperational" 
child assumes tha t everyone's perspective is similar to  her or his own, and 
therefore, for example, others can always perceive w hat the child is currently 
perceiving. A correlate to  th is is tha t in determining how to  respond to  a situation, 
the child relies on behaviors she or he can perceive, rather than underlying 
dynamics such as intentions and causes. As Shantz (1983) describes, the young 
child observes people as a "behaviorist would, defining the person in terms of her 
environmental circumstances and observable behavior"(p. 506). In addition to this 
focus upon the perceptual, Piaget believed that the younger child tended to attend 
to  only a single dimension of her or his multifarious stimulus field. These tw o  
orientations-tending toward the physical environment and having d ifficu lty  
attending to  more than a single feature of the environm ent-leave little  room for the 
young child to  respond to more complex realities such as others' drives, intentions, 
and responsibilities.
Social cognition is currently of great interest to developmental and social 
psychologists. Many researchers have found evidence tha t children younger than 
seven years of age show some of the social-cognitive abilities Piaget reserved for 
the concrete-operational child of 7 to  11 years of age. For example, several studies 
show tha t preschoolers can accurately engage in perspective-taking tasks (Mossier, 
Marvin, & Greenberg, 1976; Selman, 1980; Shantz, 1983). As well, younger 
children may not be oriented so much to  their perceptions as to w hat is most
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salient w ith in  the environment (usually but not always a visual impression). If 
internal dynamics are made equally salient w ith  external ones, three-year-olds have 
been found to  prefer internal and emotionally-oriented descriptions of others' 
situations over external and behaviorally-oriented ones (Lillard & Flavell, 1990).
The current study investigates possible differences in younger and older children's 
social cognitions and their e ffects upon the child 's decision to  help another. In 
particular, the influence of causal attributions and affective role-taking are 
examined.
Causal Controllability
A ttribu tion  researchers have established that the perception of contro llability 
a ffects  how one responds to  potential helping situations. In particular, if the help 
recipient is perceived as a cause of her need, the potential helper is more likely to 
neglect her than if she is not perceived as a cause. Conversely, an attribution of 
causal uncontrollability to  the help recipient is more likely to  produce prosocial 
behaviors (Barnes, Ickes, & Kidd, 1979; Meyer & Mulherin, 1980; Piliavin, Rodin, & 
Piliavin, 1969; Reisenzein, 1986; Schmidt & Weiner, 1988; Weiner, 1980). W ithin 
the past 1 5 years, most research on the relation between causal contro llab ility and 
helping has been driven by W einer's attribution-affect-action model (for the most 
extensive discussion of the model, see Weiner, 1986). In th is model, cognitive 
attributions of causality prefigure one's emotional response, w hich, in turn, tends to 
shape one's behavioral response. For example, relating to  this s tudy 's concern, 
helping behavior, the model predicts tha t an attribution of "personal control over 
the cause of the need" w ill lead to  the an a ffect of anger in the observer w hich, in 
turn, leads to  the action of neglect. Conversely, an attribution of "lack of personal
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control over the cause of the need" leads to  an a ffect of sympathy w hich, in turn, 
leads to  the action of help (Weiner, 1986).
Several studies show this link in children nine- to  eleven-years-old (Barnett, 
1975; Graham & Weiner, 1991; Miller & Smith, 1977). A clear understanding of 
the link between these attribution processes and helping behaviors w ith in  younger 
children, however, remains to  be formulated. Research concerning the firs t link 
w ith in  the m odel-a ttribu tion  to  a ffe c t—has revealed findings suggestive for 
understanding children's prosocial behavior. For example, when presented w ith  a 
scenario depicting a teacher who expressed either anger or pity in response to 
another student's poor test performance, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-old children all 
understood the teacher's anger as implying the student's causal contro llab ility of 
the situation (Weiner, Graham, Stern, & Lawson, 1982). A lthough only the 9-year- 
olds interpreted the teacher's pity as implying an uncontrollable condition, further 
research suggests this may have been caused by younger children's failure to 
understand tha t lack of ability is an uncontrollable situation (Graham, Doubleday, & 
Guarino, 1984). Asked to  describe a personal experience of pity, anger, and guilt 
and to  rate the degree of contro llability that was present w ith in  each experience, no 
significant differences were found between 6- through 11-year-olds' contro llability 
ratings; the 6- to 7-year-old, 9-year-old, and 11-year-old groups of children rated 
equally low  levels of contro llability as an antecedent for pity and equally high levels 
as an antecedent for anger (Graham, Doubleday, & Guarino, 1984).
These findings suggest tha t at a young age children are able to  associate 
emotional reactions w ith  causal controllability. A methodological problem exists 
w ith in  these studies, though, insofar as they are used to  support W einer's
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attribu tion-a ffect-action model (e.g., Graham & Weiner, 1991). In both studies, 
researchers began w ith  an emotion and asked children to infer the attribution (i.e., 
level of controllability). This steps backwards on the attribu tion-a ffect-action path. 
A child being presented w ith  an emotion and, upon direction, describing the causal 
contro llab ility tha t preceded it is not the same as a child spontaneously using 
attribution processes as the basis for an emotional response to  another. Indeed, in 
a study of second-graders, fifth-graders, and college students, second-graders used 
outcome-dependent cues rather than attribution-dependent cues to  infer 1 2 
protagonists' emotions (Thompson, 1987). Whereas fifth-graders and college 
students utilized attribution-dependent cues (i.e., they analyzed the causal factors 
leading to  the outcome) and labelled the protagonists w ith  relatively complex 
emotions (e.g., pride, guilt, and anger), second-graders, using outcome-dependent 
cues, labeled the same protagonists w ith  relatively simple emotions (e.g., happy or 
sad). Consistent w ith  these findings, other research suggests tha t presented w ith  
scenarios varying in controllability, 5- and 6-year-olds show pity less dependent 
upon attributions than all other age groups except the elderly (Graham & Weiner, 
1991). These findings are congruous w ith  Piaget's (1951) predictions concerning 
the preoperational ch ild 's tendency to  attend to the perceptual.
How can we make sense of these seemingly contradictory findings 
concerning the a ttribu tion-a ffect link in younger children? As Lillard & Fla veil 
(1990) found concerning young children's preferences for describing situations, it 
could be tha t Thompson (1987) has determined that the saliency of attribution- 
dependent cues has not fu lly  emerged w ith in  younger children. When presented 
w ith  an emotion and directed  to infer causal controllability, younger children may be
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able to  do so. But when not directed--when simply presented w ith  a situation and 
asked to  infer em otion-younger children may attend to  tha t which is immediately 
salient w ith in  the situation: their visual perceptions of the outcome. First- and 
second-grade, therefore, may represent a "zone of proximal development" 
(Vygotsky, 1978) for many children's use of causal a ttributions w ith  emotional 
response. Many 5- to  7-year-old children may have learned how  to d ifferentiate 
causal contro llability and apply this attribution to  a ffect. This capacity is not fu lly  
developed, however, such tha t these younger children know causality 
considerations are immanently salient as a basis for their emotional responses and 
therefore can and should be used w ith in  helping situations independent of direction 
to  do so.
In Thompson's (1987) study, no significant differences were found between 
the responses of fifth-graders and college students. By at least fifth  grade, then, 
children's attributional processes seem to be in a very mature form. Assuming the 
affect-action link, one should expect tha t causal attributions would a ffect their 
prosocial responses in a similar manner as suggested by the literature on adult's 
prosocial behavior (i.e., uncontrollability leads to  sympathy and helping behavior, 
and contro llability leads to  anger and neglect) (Weiner, 1986). Second-grade 
children's pity, though, attending to  outcome-dependent cues, is less differentiated 
than older children's and therefore prosocial responses should be less differentiated 
as well; when presented w ith  someone who needs help, younger children should 
tend to  take th is need at face-value and respond w ith  helping behavior.
Although this last hypothesis concerning young children's prosocial behavior 
logically is consistent w ith  previous research on attributions and a ffects and
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Piaget's form ulations, the one published study of children's causal attributions and 
helping behavior questions it. Five- and 6-year-old children did report less 
attributionally-discrim inant pity, but these children's judgments of helping behaviors 
were more consistent w ith  an attribution-dependent than outcome-dependent 
cognitive perspective (Graham & Weiner, 1991); a d istinct difference appears in 
their reports of offering help to uncontrollable and controllable needs. This 
difference was consistent w ith  reports of help giving in other age groups (10- to 
1 2-, 1 8 - to 20-, 35- to  45-, 60- to 74-, and 75- to 90-year-olds). In a recent 
unpublished study, however, first-grade children's judgments of helping behaviors 
were more consistent w ith  an outcome-dependent than an attribution-dependent 
social-cognitive perspective (Schultz & Shaver, 1995). Appendix A presents the 
mean reports of helping from this study as a function of the child 's grade, causal 
condition, and direction to  role-take. Fifth-grade children's prosocial judgments 
were found to  f it  w ith in  an attribution-dependent model. A lthough these results for 
younger children may seem contradictory to previous research (i.e., Graham & 
Weiner, 1991), the previously noted discrepancy w ith in  research methodologies 
concerning attributions and a ffects may explain the difference here as well. In the 
Graham & Weiner (1991) study, subjects were asked to  rate the degree of causal 
contro llability prior to making judgments about one's a ffective or helping response. 
This methodology therefore makes causal attributions salient to  the subject. In the 
Schultz & Shaver (1995) study, the perceived contro llability question came after 
the question of prosocial response. The participant therefore was responsible for 
attending to  attribution cues on her or his own and subsequently differentiating 
between prosocial responses accordingly. Understanding 5- and 6-year old children
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to  be in a zone of proximal development concerning the association between causal 
a ttributions and helping behaviors, one may expect the differences in judgments of 
helping between the Graham & Weiner (1991) and the Schultz & Shaver (1995) 
studies.
The present study continues the exploration of age-related associations 
between attribution processes and prosocial responses. A lthough being able to 
perceive differences in causal contro llability, first-graders' judgments of prosocial 
response are predicted to  be more consistent w ith  an outcome-dependent than 
attribution-dependent perspective, unless the question of causal contro llability 
previously has been made salient to  them. Fifth-graders' reports of prosocial 
response are predicted to  reflect the use of attribution-dependent social-cognitive 
perspective independent of direction to do so.
A ffec tive  Role-Taking
In order tha t an attributional analysis of emotional reactiv ity may become a 
useful developmental one, Thompson (1987) has claimed that it must be broadened 
to  include other "social-cognitive" and "social-contextual" processes. Consistent 
w ith  th is call w ith in  the helping sphere, the present study is concerned w ith  the 
interaction between causal attributions and the social-cognitive strategy of role- 
taking, defined by Hoffman (1984) as "the cognitive act of imagining oneself in 
another's place" (p. 106). The influences "a ffective " ro le-taking-in ferring the 
feelings of another-m ay have on the enactment of children's prosocial responses 
are of particular interest.
W hy should affective role-taking influence the child 's decision to  help? The 
answer to  th is lies w ith in  a recurring topic of interest in the developmental and
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social psychological literature: the relationship between empathy and prosocial 
behavior. Empathy, defined by Hoffman (1984) as "having a feeling more 
appropriate to  another's situation than to  one's ow n" (p. 103), has been assumed 
by many theorists to  promote prosocial behaviors (Batson, 1987; Hoffman, 1978; 
Staub, 1979; Underwood & Moore, 1982). A lthough this assumption is appealing 
intu itive ly, the research surrounding it has been controversial. A meta-analysis of 
the literature a decade ago concluded tha t empathy is not significantly related to 
prosocial behavior, although it was suggested tha t in mature adults a positive 
correlation between the tw o  should appear (Underwood & Moore, 1982). Other 
theorists responded that these findings reflect researchers' failure to  distinguish 
between sym pathy and personal distress (Batson, 1987; Eisenberg, McCreath, & 
Ahn, 1988; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). Whereas 
"sym pathy" is an empathic reaction tha t contains an other-oriented response and 
therefore leads to  helping behavior, "personal distress" is an empathic reaction tha t 
contains egoistic motivation and brings about a desire to reduce anxiety w ith in  
oneself. Based upon this distinction and distinguishing between d ifferent methods 
o f measuring empathy, a more recent meta-analysis concluded that a positive 
correlation exists between most empathy indices and prosocial responses, although, 
as previously suggested, this relationship is much more consistent for adults than 
children (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987b). A ttem pting to explain the increased 
correlation between empathy and prosocial response found across the life span, 
Eisenberg and Miller (1987b) made tw o  suggestions: 1) younger children may have 
some d ifficu lty  in understanding their own emotional arousal, and 2 ) younger 
children are developing competence to  assert themselves prosocially. Combined,
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these tw o  factors may cause an inconsistency between children's emotional states 
and socially anticipated responses to those states.
The empirical relation between empathy and helping behavior is important 
for understanding affective role-taking because many theorists have assumed that 
empathy is often a consequence of role-taking (Batson, 1987; Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1990; Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991; Feshbach, 1975; Hoffman, 1982; 
Stotland, Sherman, & Shaver, 1971). Research provides some support for this 
association. Children watching a videotape who reported spontaneously using role- 
taking strategies (either imagining they were the protagonist or imagining the 
events were happening to them) rated higher on Bryant's (1982) empathy measure 
than the children who did not use such strategies (Chovil, 1985 as discussed in 
Strayer, 1987). Interesting differences associated w ith  age have been found as 
well. Of children presented w ith  sad stories and asked to  maximize or minimize 
their empathic responses, whereas a little  over tw o-th irds of the fourth-graders 
utilized a role-taking strategy to  maximize their empathy, only about a third of 
kindergarteners and first-graders used role-taking (Bengtsson & Johnson, 1987). 
Most of the rest of the younger children thought about sad things unrelated to  the 
s to ry 's  content, such as breaking a leg. These findings both support and challenge 
Piaget's notion of egocentrism 's sovereignty over younger children; although 
definite differences are found between younger and older children's utilization of 
role-taking, a third of Bengtsson & Johnson's (1987) younger children reported 
evidence of role-taking abilities.
These previous studies suggest tha t role-taking strategies enhance empathic 
arousal among children, and the most recent meta-analysis of the literature has
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found a positive correlation (albeit weak) between empathy and prosocial behavior 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987b). Can we therefore infer that among children, affective 
role-taking strategies w ill promote prosocial behaviors, especially among older 
children? Although th is link logically is compelling, empirical evidence has been 
inconsistent (for reviews, see Eisenberg, 1986; Underwood & Moore, 1982). Some 
researchers have found no relationship between children's a ffective  role-taking and 
prosocial behaviors (Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980) or even a negative relation 
(Barnett & Thompson, 1984). Other studies have established a positive relationship 
(Brehm, Powell, & Coke, 1984; Denham, 1986; Howard & Barnett, 1981; lannotti, 
1978). These inconsistencies do not seem to be accountable by differences in the 
ages of the children involved; even younger children's helping behaviors have been 
found to be influenced by affective role-taking. For example, preschool through 
2nd-grade children who were instructed to  focus upon the feelings of boys and girls 
who would receive no prizes in another class were found to  donate more tokens to 
these hypothetical students than their respective control group peers (Howard & 
Barnett, 1981). Also, and interestingly, other research w ith  first-grade children 
found tha t "em pathy ins tru c tion s "-fo r the subject to place herself or himself in the 
target person's shoes-s ign ificantly  increased donating behaviors of boys but not 
girls (Brehm, Powell, & Coke, 1984).
Examining role-taking w ith in  the prosocial m otivation literature is 
illum inating. Eisenberg and her colleagues have classified reasonings children give 
to  explain their prosocial behavior (e.g., "I'd  help because I w an t her to like me" or 
"I'd  help because I'd w ant somebody to help me in tha t s ituation") according to 
Eisenberg-Berg's (1979) prosocial moral reasoning categories and analyzed them for
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age and gender differences. Eisenberg and her colleagues find no evidence that 
first-grade American children or younger children manipulate the cognitive strategy 
of role-taking on their own; in the one longitudinal study conducted on prosocial 
decision-making, no child reported using a role-taking strategy (e.g., " If I were in 
her situation, I'd w ant someone to  help me") until the age of seven (Eisenberg et 
a!., 1983). As well, in a study in which first-grade children had previously been 
directed to  imagine how they would feel in the other person's position, still no firs t- 
grade children reported role-taking as a m otivation for helping (Schultz & Shaver, 
1995). As w ith  causal attributions, a ffective role-taking does not seem to be a 
salient social-cognitive exercise for younger children when making helping 
decisions. The use of role-taking in prosocial decision-making is a strategy tha t is 
learned in early to middle childhood, not appearing independently of direction to do 
so until the age of nine or ten (Eisenberg et a!., 1987; Schultz & Shaver, 1995).
In light of inconsistent results from previous helping research and suggestive 
evidence from w ork on prosocial reasonings, the present study predicts tha t first- 
grade children w ill not be influenced by the cognitive strategy of a ffective role- 
taking in their prosocial decisions and responses. Evidence that suggests tha t the 
association between emotions and helping behaviors becomes stronger w ith  age 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987b), though, sustains optim ism tha t fifth-graders ' reports of 
prosocial responses w ill be affected by role-taking.
The Integration of Causal Controllability and A ffective  Role-Taking
One published study has examined the integration of causal attributions and 
role-taking. Betancourt (1990) manipulated both college students' cognitive 
strategy and the situation 's controllability and examined students' judgments of
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helping. Half of the subjects were instructed to  "imagine how the person feels 
about w ha t happened and how it a ffects his or her life ," and the other half were 
instructed simply to  attend to the facts of the situation. "Empathic set" (i.e., 
cognitive strategy) and perceived controllability were found to  have an additive 
e ffec t on helping. Also, one's empathic set affected the extent to  which one 
perceived the situation as controllable. When asked prior to  hearing the scenario to 
"imagine how the person feels about w hat happened and how it a ffects his or her 
life ," subjects reported perceiving scenarios as less controllable. Such a finding is a 
good example of the benefits of research integrating social-cognitive processes: 
although attribution processes have been found to  a ffect adult's helping behaviors 
in a particular manner, Betancourt's (1990) study shows tha t the process of making 
a ttributions can be affected significantly by a third variab le-in  this case, role-taking- 
-that subsequently a ffects helping behaviors.
A lthough the additive relationship between causal attributions and affective 
role-taking is established for adults, how do the tw o  processes interact w ith in  
children, especially younger children who may only inconsistently utilize these social 
cognitions? One study has investigated th is and received interesting results 
(Schultz & Shaver, 1995). Table 1 presents the mean reports of helping as a 
function of the child 's grade, causal condition, and role-taking instructions. Results 
were analyzed separately by grade level. Consistent w ith  Piaget's formulations, 
among first-grade children neither an interaction nor main e ffects occurred between 
or w ith in  causal attributions and affective role-taking; first-grade children remained 
outcome-dependent. Among fifth-graders, however, an interaction was found such 
tha t when instructed to  role-take, a previously reported differentiation in helping
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based upon perceived controllability disappeared, F (1 ,2 6 ) = 4 .90 , p <  .05. In 
fifth-graders ' prosocial responses, therefore, a ffective role-taking can be seen as 
moderating the negative e ffects of an attribution of causal controllability.
Assuming that a ffec t leads to action, one could hypothesize that the decreased 
a ffec t due to  an attribution of causal controllability (and therefore less helping) was 
counteracted by an increased a ffect due to  a ffective role-taking (and therefore a 
return to  an expected or average amount of helping). Role-taking may not have 
beeen found to have an additive e ffec t w ith  causal controllability among older 
children because a lim it may exist to the amount of a ffect necessary for an 
affirm ative prosocial response. The present study is predicted to verify Schultz & 
Shaver's (1995) results.
Prosocial Reasoning
Differences in younger and older children's social-cognitive processing 
become evident when listening to  their reasonings w hy they say they help. In 
making prosocial decisions young children have been found to use hedonistic and 
needs-oriented (i.e., simply attending to another's  need) reasonings predominantly 
(Eisenberg, Lennon, & Roth, 1983; Schultz & Shaver, 1995). This finding 
concerning a needs-orientation is consistent w ith  the previously noted finding that 
firs t- and second-grade children's emotional reactions and prosocial responses tend 
to  be outcome-dependent rather than attribution-dependent (Schultz & Shaver, 
1995; Thompson, 1987); a young child tends to assess a situation by its physical 
circumstances and respond according to this assessment. A lthough fifth-grade 
children also predominantly use needs-oriented reasonings, unlike younger children, 
other types of reasonings such as pragmatic concerns, interpersonal approval, and
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role-taking are utilized significantly as well (Eisenberg, Shell, Pasternack, Lennon, 
Beller, & Mathy, 1987; Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & Shea, 1991; Schultz & 
Shaver, 1995). These findings further support the previously hypothesized social- 
cognitive differences between early and middle childhood.
In addition to  illuminating differences in younger and older children's social- 
cognitive functioning, the present study's interest in Eisenberg-Berg's prosocial 
moral reasoning categories (1979) also is in determining if categories or 
subcategories need to be added to  the established 10 categories w ith  18 
subcategories. In particular, Eisenberg-Berg's (1979) categories do not include an 
explic it category for the use of causal attributions. Analysis of prosocial decision­
making research therefore does not inform one of the relative utilization of 
attributional processes in children's prosocial reasoning. In previous research the 
author created and added a "responsibility orientation" category to  Eisenberg-Berg's 
categories (1979) and found tha t a significant difference existed between firs t- and 
fifth-grade children's utilization of this type of reasoning, F (1,57) = 8 .72 , p <  .01 
(Schultz & Shaver, 1995). No first-grade children, in fact, reported using this 
strategy at all. The use of th is type of reasoning relative to  other categories could 
not be analyzed validly in th is study, though, as children were asked to  rate the 
other person's contro llability of the situation as part of the previous testing process. 
The present study w ill incorporate Schultz & Shaver's (1995) adaptation of 
Eisenberg-Berg's categories and analyze children's decision-making accordingly. 
Hypotheses
To reiterate, the hypotheses for the present study are the fo llow ing: 1) 
although being able to perceive differences in causal contro llability, first-graders'
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judgments of prosocial response w ill be more consistent w ith  an outcome- 
dependent than attribution-dependent perspective unless the question of causal 
contro llability previously has been made salient to  them, 2) if the question of causal 
contro llability previously has been made salient to them, first-graders judgments of 
prosocial response w ill be consistent w ith  an attribution-dependent perspective, 3) 
fifth-graders 's judgments of prosocial response w ill reflect an ability to  use an 
attribution-dependent social-cognitive perspective on their own, 4) a ffective  role- 
taking w ill increase judgments of prosocial behaviors in fifth - but not first-grade 
subjects, and 5) among fifth-grade children, an interaction w ill occur between the 
s ituation 's causal contro llability and the direction to role-take Such tha t when 
instructed to  role-take, a previously reported d ifferentiation in helping based upon 
causal contro llability w ill disappear.
Method
Participants
Ninety-four first-grade (47 females, 47 males) and 69 fifth-grade (41 
females, 28 males) children participated. Participants were students at one of tw o  
public elementary schools w ith in  the Williamsburg-James City County (Virginia) 
Public School system. Parental consent forms were distributed to all firs t- and fifth - 
grade children w ith in  these tw o  schools. Children who returned a signed parental 
consent form were able to  participate. Appendix A is a copy of the consent form. 
The children were divided by grade and gender and then randomly assigned to  one 
of four conditions created by varying whether or not the protagonists in the stories 
could have controlled the situations and whether or not the child responded to the 
contro llab ility question before the helping measure. Children were assured that
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participation in the study could be term inated at any time w ithou t penalty, including 
during the experiment itself.
Materials
W ith some adaptations, the materials utilized were comparable to  those of 
Schultz & Shaver (1995). Two vignettes were developed in which children are 
confronted w ith  a choice to  either make a personal sacrifice and help a same-age, 
same-gender, same-ethnic identity peer or continue in a self-rewarding behavior.
One vignette concerned a child looking for a favorite drawing before school while 
the participant is engaged in her or his favorite preoccupation (e.g., playing on the 
computer, drawing, reading). This story was previously used w ith  success by 
Schultz & Shaver (1995). The second concerned a child needing a quarter for lunch 
tha t, depending upon whether or not the participant gives her or him the quarter, 
w ill make the difference between whether or not the participant can afford to  buy 
her or his favorite dessert. This vignette was developed for the present study.
Pen and ink illustrations portraying the vignettes were made in order to help 
children visualize and fo llow  the stories. Separate drawings were sketched for male 
and female and Caucasian and African-American children. The illustrations 
purposefully were drawn w ithou t a depiction of the protagonists' facial expressions, 
lest the facial expressions influence the children's responses.
The stories w ith in  each vignette were varied based on the protagonist's 
control over the outcome. The favorite drawing became lost when either: 1) the 
child le ft it lying out after school the day before (controllable condition), or 2) 
another child took it from inside the child 's desk and subsequently lost it 
(uncontrollable condition). A quarter is needed for lunch because either: 1) the child
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spent a quarter before school at the school store (controllable situation), or 2) the 
ch ild 's parents did not give her or him enough money when she or he le ft for school 
tha t day (uncontrollable condition). The order of story presentation was 
counterbalanced across the child 's grade, the child 's gender, the causal condition, 
and the order of the questions.
The number of questions fo llow ing each story was five or six depending 
upon whether or not the role-taking manipulation occured. Four questions asked 
how much the participant: 1) would feel sorry for the other child, 2) would w ant to 
look for the drawing (or give her or him a quarter), 3) would w ant to keep playing 
w ith  the favorite preoccupation (or keep the quarter), or 4) could have stopped the 
situation from happening. Participants responded to these questions by pointing to 
one of five increasingly large stacks of checkers (used by Eisenberg et a!., 1987). 
Each stack had a label in front of it tha t either said, "Not at all," "A  little ," 
"Som ew hat," "Very m uch," or "To ta lly ." A fifth  direction/question was the 
a ffective  role-taking manipulation. Participants were directed, "Now  I w ant you to 
imagine you are the one who is missing your favorite drawing (or needs a quarter), 
and you w ant to  find it,"  and then asked, "How does a person feel when a person 
is missing a favorite drawing and wants to  find it (or needs money like this)?"
Finally, the sixth question examined the partic ipant's m otivation for helping.
Children were asked, "When trying to decide whether to  look for the drawing (or 
give her or him the quarter) or keep (engaging in your favorite preoccupation or the 
quarter), w hat are some things you would th ink about?" If children were slow to  
respond, the question was rephrased to, "W hy would you w ant to look for the 
drawing (or give her or him the quarter) or keep (engaging in your favorite
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preoccupation or the quarter)?"
An adapted version of Eisenberg's (1979) Prosocial Moral Reasoning 
Categories was utilized to  evaluate children's m otivations for helping. Appendix B 
presents this adapted version. Due to  the immanent presence of controllability 
issues w ith in  the study, in addition to the 10 categories employed by Eisenberg, an 
1 1th category of Responsibility Orientation (e.g., " It was her fau lt") was adopted. 
As w ell, because of the vagueness of some needs oriented responses (i.e., not 
clearly a psychological or physical needs orientation) such as " It is her favorite  
draw ing," a third subcategory under the Needs-Oriented category was utilized: 
Context of Need.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to  that used by Schultz & Shaver (1995).
Children were tested individually at their school. The experimenter was one of tw o  
W hite males enrolled either as a graduate or undergraduate student at the College 
of W illiam & Mary. All of the participants at one of the schools were tested by the 
undergraduate experimenter, and the participants at the second school were 
randomly tested by the tw o  experimenters. Preliminary analyses revealed no 
significant differences in children's willingness to help based upon the experimenter 
differences. The experimenter sat next to  the child at a table removed from the 
rest of the children and teachers. The study was explained as an attem pt to  find 
out w ha t children would do in certain situations. Each child was assured of 
confidentia lity  and tha t participation could be term inated at any time.
Before each child heard the stories, the experimenter conducted warm-up 
exercises w ith  her or him. These exercises familiarized the children w ith  the
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measures utilized in the study. During these exercises the participant was asked to 
indicate a favorite ac tiv ity  that could be performed in the classroom alone before 
school, and a favorite dessert at the school cafeteria. This information was 
subsequently applied to  the appropriate vignette in order that the psychological 
meaning and impact of the personal sacrifice and stories were consistent for 
d iffe rent participants.
Following the warm-up exercises, the experiment proceeded as fo llows. 
While holding up the illustration specific to  the vignette and gender and race of the 
child, the experimenter read the vignette from a script. Following each story, 
children responded to the five or six questions. In order to address the question of 
whether or not making children salient of causal controllability a ffects reports of 
prosocial response, d ifferent participants responded to stories in one of tw o  
question orders. Half of the participants responded to questions in the fo llow ing 
order: extent of sorrow, desire to  help, desire to  keep for self, extent of 
protagonist's control, and motivations for helping. The other half responded to the 
contro llab ility question firs t and then the other questions in the same order. For all 
participants, the role-taking manipulation and question occurred fo llow ing the 
sorrow question during the second vignette they heard.
The experimenter recorded the child 's answers on a separate answer sheet. 
Responses to  the role-taking and m otivations for helping questions were recorded 
verbatim . Two coders blind to the study's hypotheses rated the m otivations for 
helping according to  the adapted version of Eisenberg's (1979) Prosocial Moral 
Reasoning Categories. Participants' responses to  the motivations for helping 
question typ ica lly were several sentences in length. Each of these answers was
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analyzed for the degree to  which a particular type of m otivation, as represented by 
each subcategory, was present in the ch ild 's response. A score of "1 "  was given if 
no reference to that particular type of reasoning was present, "2 " if a vague 
reference was made, "3 " if a clear reference existed, and "4 " if the subcategory 
was a dominant mode of reasoning. A fte r individually rating the subcategories, the 
tw o  raters collaborated until inter-rater reliability reached 1.00 for all subcategories. 
The scores from each child 's tw o  vignettes were then added to  obtain a general 
score for the child 's use of each subcategory. To correspond more closely w ith  the 
mean scores obtained by Eisenberg and her colleagues, who have had participants 
respond to  four stories (Eisenberg e ta /., 1983; Eisenberg e ta /., 1987; Eisenberg et 
a/., 1991), each child 's subcategory scores were then doubled, making the range of 
possible subcategory scores from 4 to  16. Scores for categories were obtained by 
adding the subcategory scores w ith in each category.
Results
Data Analysis
The major hypotheses concerning causal contro llab ility 's and a ffective role- 
tak ing 's e ffects upon the tw o  d ifferent grade levels' reports of w illingness to  help 
were analyzed in a 2 X 2 X 2 (Grade X Causal Condition X Role-Taking Direction) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) w ith  repeated measures on the third variable. This 
analysis revealed a significant grade level difference for role-taking's e ffects, which 
w ill be presented later, but not causal contro llability 's. As first-grade children's 
responses were more variable than fifth-grade children's, however, some reason 
existed to  suspect this null finding concerning causal controllability. This being the 
case, separate 2 X 2  (Causal Condition X Role-Taking Direction) ANOVAs for each
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grade w ith  repeated measures on the second variable were also performed to 
examine causal contro llab ility 's e ffects upon each grade more closely. The results 
of these analyses are presented in the fo llow ing section.
Causal Controllability
Table 2 presents the mean reports of w illingness to  help as a function of the 
ch ild 's grade level, causal condition, and direction to  role-take. As mentioned 
above, the omnibus ANOVA tha t included grade did not find an interaction between 
grade and causal condition. The results from the separate ANOVAs for each grade, 
however, suggest grade-level differences may exist. Consistent w ith  Schultz & 
Shaver's (1995) results, causal condition was not significantly found to  a ffec t first- 
grade children's w illingness to help. In the analysis of fifth-grade children's helping 
responses, however, causal condition did a ffect w illingness to  help, ^ (1 ,6 7 ; MSe = 
1.45) = 9 .60 , p <  .01. Fifth-grade children were more likely to help protagonists 
who did not causally control their situation (M  = 3.25) than those who did (M  =
2.61).
To examine whether or not differences in question order may have 
accounted for the disparity between Graham & W einer's (1991) and Schultz & 
Shaver's (1995) findings concerning first-grade children's w illingness to help, 
question order e ffects for first-grade children were analyzed in a 2 X 2 (Question 
Order X Causal Condition) ANOVA w ith  willingness to  help fo llow ing the firs t story 
as the dependent variable. Self-report of helping fo llow ing the second story was 
excluded from analysis because once the children heard all the questions fo llow ing 
the firs t story the issue of protagonist contro llability was known by the participant 
to  be a salient feature of the study. First-grade children reported more w illingness
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to  help if they were not asked about the protagonist's contro llability of the situation 
prior to  the helping measure (M = 3 .33) than if they were (M  = 2 .78), F  {1,90;
Mse = 1.84) = 3 .80 , p = .054. Although this general e ffec t was found, a 
significant interaction between the question order and the causal contro llability of 
the situation was not found; question order was not found to  a ffect w illingness to 
help p ro tagon is ts-w ho  either did or did not cause their s itua tions-d iffe ren tly . This 
being the case, the discrepancies between Graham & W einer's (1991) and Schultz 
& Shaver's (1995) results would not seem to be attributable to d iffe rent question 
orders.
To understand the relationship between the child 's grade and the causal 
condition further, 2 X 2  (Grade X Role-taking Condition) ANOVAs w ith  repeated 
measures on the second variable were performed for each of the tw o  causal 
conditions. W ithin vignettes w ith  protagonists who caused their predicament, a 
trend was found for first-grade children to  be more willing to  help the protagonist 
(M  = 3.02) than fifth-grade children (M  = 2.61), F (1 ,8 1 ; MSe = 1.93) = 3 .47 , p 
< .07. W ithin vignettes w ith  protagonists who did not cause their predicament, 
though, no sign ificant difference was found. This may seem to suggest tha t 
differences between younger and older children's w illingness to  help based upon 
causal contro llab ility is more accountable by differences in response to controllable 
situations than uncontrollable ones, but, again, the originally reported omnibus 
ANOVA tha t included grade did not reveal a significant interaction between the 
child 's grade and the causal condition.
In considering possible differences between younger and older children's 
utilization of causal attributions in their helping decisions, a next question becomes,
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Do firs t- and fifth-grade children perceive the causality of situations similarly? In 
order to answer this question, a 2 X 2 X 2 (Grade X Causal Condition X Gender) 
ANOVA was performed on responses fo llow ing the firs t story to  the question,
"How  much could s/he have stopped th is from happening?" Table 3 presents 
children's mean perceptions of contro llability as a function of their grade, causal 
condition, and direction to  role-take. An interaction between grade and perceived 
contro llability was not found. Rather, an overall main e ffect for causal condition 
was found such tha t protagonists w ith in  the controllable situations were perceived 
as having more causal control over the predicament (M  = 3 .87) than those w ith in  
uncontrollable situations (M  = 3 .03), F (1,1 55; MSe = 1.63) = 1 7 .91 , p  < .001.
A main e ffec t for grade was also found such that fifth-grade children perceived 
more causality in the protagonist's actions (M = 4 .03) than first-grade children (M  
= 3 .03), F (1 ,155; MSe = 1.63) = 24 .98 , p <  .001. First-grade and fifth-grade 
children did perceive causality distinctions in a similar manner, therefore, but fifth - 
grade children in general saw more causal controllability than first-grade children.
Neither first- nor fifth-grade children's perceptions of contro llab ility were 
sign ificantly related to their w illingness to  help fo llow ing the firs t or the second 
story, though. Table 4 presents the correlations for both first- and fifth-grade 
children between perceived contro llability, sympathy, willingness to help, and desire 
to  keep the quarter (or keep playing a favorite preoccupation) fo llow ing the first 
story. One would expect tha t the correlation between perceived contro llab ility and 
w illingness to help would be significantly negative, but this was not the case. 
Apparently, although both firs t- and fifth-grade children make causal attributions, 
these attributions are either unrelated or only moderately related to  their helping
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decisions. Among the dependent variables, only sympathy and desire to  keep the 
quarter (or keep playing a favorite preoccupation) were correlated significantly w ith  
w illingness to  help. This was true for both first-grade, r(92) = .44, p  < .001 , and 
fifth-grade, r(67) = .58, p <  .001 , children's sympathy and first-grade, r(92) = - 
.64, p  < .001, and fifth-grade, r(67) = -.41 , p < .001, children's desire to  keep 
the quarter (or playing w ith  a favorite preoccupation. One may hypothesize that 
the relationship between the children's desire to keep and w illingness to  help shows 
tha t those who desired to  have their favorite dessert more (or keep playing their 
favorite  activ ity) were less w illing to help, but this causal relationship between 
w illingness to  help and desire to  keep was not established.
The extent to  which children fe lt sorry for the protagonist was analyzed in a 
2 X 2 X 2 X 2 (Grade X Causal Condition X Question Order X Practice Effects) 
ANOVA w ith  repeated measures on the fourth factor. The fourth factor is labelled 
"Practice E ffects" as opposed to  "Role-taking" because the sym pathy measure was 
always taken prior to  the direction to  role-take; differences in reported sympathy 
fo llow ing the firs t and second story therefore cannot be due to  role-taking but 
rather are due to  practice effects. Table 5 presents children's mean report of 
sym pathy as a function of their grade, causal condition, and question order. Grade 
was found to  interact w ith  causal condition such that first- and fifth-grade 
children's sym pathy for protagonists who did not cause their predicaments (M 's  = 
3 .59 & 3 .22 , respectively) and first-grade children's sympathy for those who did 
{M  = 3.41) were similar, but fifth-grade children responding to  a protagonist who 
did cause her or his situation reported less sympathy than these others (M  = 2.40), 
F  (1,1 55; MSe = 2.06) = 4 .1 9 i p  <  .05. Similar to first-grade children's
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willingness to help, therefore, their sympathy was not attribution-dependent.
Question order was found to moderate the e ffects of causality on sympathy, 
F  (1 ,147) = 8 .57 , p  < .01. When the question of perceived contro llability was 
asked prior to  the sym pathy measure, reported sym pathy toward protagonists who 
caused their predicaments (M  = 3.17) and those who did not (M  = 3.19) was 
similar. When the sympathy measure was the firs t question asked, however, 
protagonists who did not cause their situations received more sympathy (M  =
3.61) than those who did (M = 2.63). This result is counterintu itive. One would 
expect tha t making the controllability issue salient by asking a question about it 
would lead to  increased distinctions in subsequent sym pathetic response to 
protagonists. Conversely, however, making a contro llability judgment prior to  a 
sym pathy judgment erased differences tha t were present otherwise.
A ffec tive  Role-taking
The previously mentioned 2 X 2 X 2  (Grade X Causal Condition X Role- 
Taking) ANOVA w ith  repeated measures on the third factor detected a trend for 
ro le-taking's e ffects upon willingness to help to interact w ith  the child 's grade level, 
F  (1 ,147) = 3 .60 , p  < .06. The separate 2 X 2  (Causal Condition X Role-Taking) 
ANOVAs for each grade found that first-grade children's willingness to  help {M = 
3 .06 , SD = 1.37) did not significantly increase after receiving role-taking 
instructions {M  = 3 .07 , SD = 1.53), but fifth-grade children's did (M 's =  2 .68 & 
3 .17  and SD's =  1.37 & 1.15, respectively), F (1 ,6 7 ) = 8 .55 , p <  .01.
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The Integration of Causal Controllability and A ffective  Role-taking
W ithin the 2 X 2  (Causal Condition X Role-Taking) ANOVA for the fifth - 
grade children, the e ffects of role-taking did not interact w ith  the s ituation 's causal 
condition; role-taking and causal condition had an additive e ffec t upon their 
w illingness to  help. An interesting interaction did occur, however, between causal 
condition and role-taking in children's perceptions of contro llability. Although main 
e ffects  for causal condition were found fo llow ing the firs t story each child heard, 
analyzing perceived contro llability including both stories i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2  (Grade 
X Causal Condition X Role-taking X Question Order) ANOVA, w ith  repeated 
measures on the third variable, found a significant causal condition by role-taking 
interaction, F (1,1 55; MSe = 1.32) = 10.95, p < .01. Whereas children perceived 
differences in causal controllability fo llow ing the firs t story consistent w ith  the 
causal condition (M 's  = 3 .87 & 3 .03 for controllable and uncontrollable situations, 
respectively), they did not make th is distinction fo llow ing the second story (M 's  = 
3 .46 & 3.45). A firs t hypothesis concerning w hy this m ight be the case is tha t the 
role-taking direction affected the perception of contro llability such tha t imagining 
oneself in the other's situation homogenized d ifferent children's perceptions. This 
being the case, one would expect an interaction between the question order and 
role-taking, because the second story 's  question of perceived contro llab ility was 
either asked before or after the role-taking manipulation depending upon the 
question order. This interaction was not found, however.
Because asking the perceived contro llability question before and after role- 
taking produced sta tistica lly similar results, the interaction between causal condition 
and role-taking is not so much between causal condition and role-taking as between
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causal condition and practice effects. W hy practice e ffects would produce these 
means is d ifficu lt to  understand. A fte r responding to a perceived contro llability 
measure fo llow ing the firs t story, the child probably was more attentive to  
contro llab ility  issues when listening to  the second story. This would probably 
produce an increase in perceived contro llability w ith in  both causal conditions, 
though, rather than a regression to  the mean. A regression to the mean 
interpretation seems most appropriate, but the strength of the present e ffec t seems 
stronger than a typical regression to the mean; the significantly d ifferent means for 
causal condition fo llow ing the first story not only became insignificant but became 
v irtua lly identical after the second story.
Prosocial Reasoning
Table 6 presents the mean scores for each prosocial moral reasoning 
subcategory and category as a function of the child 's grade and gender. For both 
firs t- and fifth-grade 's, the most prevalent mode of reasoning was hedonistic. This 
reflects the element of personal sacrifice intrinsic w ith in  their prosocial decisions; 
children did not w ant to  stop participating in their self-proclaimed "favorite " ac tiv ity  
or part w ith  the quarter tha t would allow them to buy their self-declared "favorite " 
dessert. The second m ost-often used type of decision-making for both firs t- and 
fifth-grade children was a concern for the others' needs. This reasoning category 
has been found to  be the most prevalent mode of reasoning in other research (e.g., 
Eisenberg et a!., 1983; Eisenberg, e ta /., 1987), but the personal sacrifice entailed 
w ith  helping in the present study was probably emotionally greater than tha t in 
other studies.
Prosocial moral reasoning subcategory scores were analyzed in a 2 X 2
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(Grade X Gender) m ultivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) w ith  the 21 
subcategories as a multivariate dependent measure. Despite overall sim ilarities, 
firs t- and fifth-grade children reasoned d ifferently, Pillai's trace = .36, approximate 
F  = 3 .73  w ith  21 and 139 df, p < .001. Univariate F-tests revealed tha t fifth - 
grade children used certain types of reasoning more than first-grade. First-grade 
children utilized a responsibility orientation (e.g., " It was her fau lt") considerably {M  
= 5 .00), but this type of reasoning was found to  be the second most prevalent 
mode of m otiva tion-hedonistic  gain to  self being the firs t-am ong fifth-grade 
children (M = 7.1 9), F (1,1 59; MSe = 10.50) = 20 .12 , p < .001. Consistent 
w ith  grade-level differences in role-taking's e ffects upon willingness to help, very 
few  first-grade children considered how they would feel in the other's situation 
when explaining their w illingness to help (M  = 4 .09), but this type of judgment 
was used considerably by fifth-grade children (M  = 4 .84), F (1,1 59; MSe = 3.26)
= 6 .07 , p <  .05. As well, direct reciprocity (e.g., "I'd  give her a quarter because 
she'd give me money sometime when I needed it") was used infrequently by first- 
grade children (M = 4.02) but fairly commonly by fifth-grade children {M  = 4 .46), 
F (1 ,1 5 9 ; MSe = .92) = 9.86, p < .01, and, finally, fifth-grade children considered 
the context of the other's need (e.g., " It 's  her favorite draw ing") more frequently 
(M  = 5.94) than first-grade children (M  = 4 .83), F (1,1 59; MSe = 6.03) = 7.49, p 
<  .01.
Discussion
Consistent w ith  Piaget's claims that younger children attend to  immediate 
cues from the physical environment, first-grade children were found to be largely 
outcome-dependent in their prosocial decisions. Abstract social-cognitive processes
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such as causal attributions and affective role-taking did influence fifth-grade 
children's judgments. These differences are of degree and not of kind, however, as 
firs t- and fifth-grade children overall were not found to  d iffe r significantly in the use 
of causal a ttributions in their helping decisions and only marginally did so in their 
utilization of a ffective  role-taking.
Causal Controllability
As predicted, when the question of causal contro llability was not made 
salient to  first-grade children, their w illingness to  help was not affected by the 
other's causal contro llability of the situation. As well, and consistent w ith  previous 
findings, fifth-grade children did make this distinction w ithou t prompting (Barnett, 
1975; Graham & Weiner, 1991; Miller & Smith, 1977). Contrary to  predictions, 
however, making causal contro llability salient by asking a question concerning it 
prior to the helping measure still did not lead to a significant difference in first-grade 
children's willingness to help protagonists who either did or did not causally control 
their situations. This result is inconsistent w ith  the results of Graham & Weiner 
(1991), w ho found tha t first-grade children reported responding d iffe rently  based 
upon th is d istinction. A methodological consideration may help explain the 
discrepancies between Graham & W einer's (1991) and Schultz & Shaver's (1995) 
results. Graham & W einer's tw o  uncontrollable scenarios involved a person w ith  a 
cast falling forward and knocking one over and a person becoming ill and failing to 
feed one's goldfish. These stories not only alleviate the protagonists from causal 
responsibility for the situations but, on account of physical handicaps, also actively 
e lic it sym pathy for them. To not help these protagonists, therefore, one must not 
only be disinterested in helping them but also overcome the social expectation that
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one should help the physically handicapped person. When uncontro llability more 
simply involves not having caused the situation, such as in the present study, the 
protagonist's contro llability or uncontrollability of the situation is not a salient 
enough reality for most younger children to  attend to and base their helping 
decisions.
Grade level differences concerning usage of causal a ttributions need to be 
stated carefully. First- and fifth-grade children were not found to  be dissimilar in 
their utilization of causal contro llability w ith in  their helping decisions. A lthough 
examining each grade individually revealed tha t whereas fifth-grade children's 
w illingness to  help was affected by causal controllability, first-grade children's was 
not affected, the overall analysis did not reveal a grade-level difference in causal 
contro llab ility 's  e ffects. In addition, examining children's m otivations for or against 
helping shows tha t a significant number of first-grade children reported orienting 
tow ard the other's responsibility for the situation. For first-grade boys, in fact, a 
responsibility orientation was the m ost-often used type of reasoning other than 
pragmatic, hedonistic gains for the self (e.g., buying dessert). In addition, among 
first-grade children, asking the contro llability question prior to the helping measure 
decreased willingness to  help in general (but not contingent upon the level of causal 
controllability). The social cognitive exercise of utilizing causal a ttributions 
therefore seems to  be in a transitional stage in younger childhood. Many younger 
children associate causality considerations w ith  their helping decisions. This 
association is not su ffic iently  established or refined, though, such tha t it produces 
sign ificantly d ifferent responses to others of differing levels of culpability. Through 
the process of hearing other people, especially one's parents, make statem ents
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such as, "I'm  not going to help her because she shouldn 't have...," younger 
children learn tha t causal controllability is a salient feature w ith in  a helping situation 
and learn to  discrim inate more precisely between agents who could have and could 
not have controlled situations.
Both firs t- and fifth-grade children were found to perceive differences 
accurately in the extent to  which the protagonist could have stopped the situation 
from happening. Their perceptions of controllability, however, were not related to  
their reports of sympathy or willingness to help. This finding seriously questions 
the applicability of W einer's (1986) attribution-affect-action model to  children, 
especially younger children. Clearly younger children are not attribution-dependent, 
and therefore the model would not apply to  their helping decisions. Even fifth - 
grade children reported an insignificant relationship between perceived 
contro llab ility  and sympathy, though, and the usefulness of the model for 
understanding children's helping decisions therefore needs to be questioned. 
A ffec tive  Role-taking
As hypothesized, affective role-taking influenced fifth-grade but not firs t- 
grade children's helping decisions. As well, whereas very few  younger children 
reported an orientation toward role-taking in their reasonings for or against helping 
the other, this was a common m otivation among fifth-grade children. These 
differences are consistent w ith  Piaget's notion that until the age of seven, the 
younger child is egocentric in her or his perspective. Not until after th is point can a 
child understand w hat another person sees or feels like. It should be noted that 
these findings do not provide evidence tha t fifth-grade children actually took the 
perspective of the other, though. The present study did not measure whether the
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e ffects of a ffective role-taking upon helping behavior are moderated by empathy or 
social desirability. The fifth-grade child could have imagined how a person would 
feel in the protagonist's situation but just as likely could have intuited tha t the 
experimenter wanted her or him to  recognize tha t if she or he was in the other's 
situation, she or he would w ant someone to  help her or him.
In either of these previous tw o  cases, though, th is finding is nonetheless 
s ignificant. For one, it adds to the literature concerning the social-cognitive 
exercise of role-taking and its e ffects upon helping. As suggested by Carlo et a/., 
1991), inconsistencies in this literature may be due to  d ifferent role-taking 
exerc ises-tha t is, a ffective , cognitive, or perceptual ro le-taking-being related or not 
related to  the demands of helping w ith in  the situations experimenters have 
presented to participants. In the present study affective role-taking is relevant to 
the helping task; how one would feel about not having her or his favorite  drawing 
may be a strong m otivator for another's w illingness to help her or him. Indeed, 
fifth-grade children were found to be more w illing to  help after imagining how they 
would feel in the other's situation. Studies tha t pay closer attention to  the match 
between the type of role-taking and the demands of the other's needs may find a 
more consistent relationship between role-taking and helping than previous research 
has. As w ell, a ffective role-taking did not a ffect first-grade children's w illingness to 
help. Regardless of whether this was moderated by empathy or social desirability, 
th is grade-level difference is significant. Assuming for a moment tha t social 
desirability is the mediating variable, this finding still reflects that a strong 
association between helping and imagining one's feelings in the other's situation is 
not found in the younger child 's mind. Even though younger children had been
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asked to  role-take immediately preceding the helping measure, they did not feel 
compelled to  report tha t they would be more w illing to  help. The relationship 
between one's feelings w ith in  the other's situation and willingness to  help is not 
strong enough, therefore, to divert the younger child 's attention away from the 
relationship between more immediate considerations (e.g., the other's physical 
needs and one's own desires) in their helping decisions.
The Integration of Causal Controllability and A ffective  Role-taking
Consistent w ith  Schultz & Shaver's (1995) findings, w ith in  fifth-grade 
children's w illingness to  help an interaction was hypothesized to occur between 
causal condition and affective role-taking. This interaction did not occur. Rather, 
causal condition and affective role-taking had an additive e ffect upon helping. This 
is consistent w ith  Betancourt's (1991) findings concerning college students and 
suggests tha t older children's social-cognitive processes are in a very mature form. 
The inconsistency w ith  Schultz & Shaver's (1995) findings probably reflects ceiling 
e ffects in their data. Out of the possible score of 5 .00, their fifth-grade children 
obtained a mean score of 4 .56  for helping a protagonist who did not cause her or 
his situation prior to  the role-taking manipulation (see Table 1 for complete report of 
means). Fifth-grade children in the uncontrollable condition therefore did not have 
much room to exhibit their a ffective role-taking prowess in relation to their 
w illingness to  help. Another plausible but elusive explanation, though, concerns the 
relationship found in the present study between causal condition and practice 
effects w ith  regards to  perceived controllability. For both first- and fifth-grade 
children, the perceived distinction found between causal conditions fo llow ing the 
firs t story disappears fo llow ing the second. If perceived contro llability were related
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to  willingness to  he lp -w h ich  it was not significantly found to  do in the present 
s tudy-then  this interaction would be consistent w ith  Schultz & Shaver's (1995) 
findings. Further research tha t presents subjects w ith  more than tw o  stories may 
prove fru itfu l for understanding these practice effects and their relationship to  fifth - 
grade children's willingness to  help.
Prosocial Reasoning
The most striking feature concerning children's m otivations for helping is 
tha t both firs t- and fifth-grade children rely heavily upon an orientation toward their 
own needs and the needs of the other. Not exclusively first-graders, therefore, but 
both firs t- and fifth-grade children fit Shantz's (1983) designation as "behaviorists." 
Despite other clear differences in social-cognitive abilities, this supports the recent 
emphasis placed by theory of mind theorists upon perceiving children in young and 
middle childhood as more similar than d ifferent (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993). It 
needs to  be noted, however, tha t other research concerning younger and older 
children's prosocial moral reasonings do not find these sim ilarities. Most studies 
find a sharp change between the preschool years and second- or third-grade such 
tha t a hedonistic orientation decreases dramatically and a needs orientation 
increases (Eisenberg, Boehnke, Schuhler, & Silbereisen, 1985; Eisenberg e ta !., 
1983). The discrepancy between the present study's data and these other studies' 
points to  the fact tha t prosocial cognitions are contextual in nature; a child w ill 
reason d iffe rently  depending upon the salient features of the situation. In the 
present study's vignettes, the personal sacrifice involved in helping was great; 
something tha t was adm ittedly the child 's "favorite" needed to  be foregone in order 
to  help. Eisenberg's stories also include an element of personal sacrifice, but they
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do not contain the personal relevance contained w ith in  the present study's 
vignettes.
Relatedly, an orientation toward the other's responsibility was utilized 
s ignificantly by both younger and older children. This is not a category included in 
Eisenberg's scheme because she has not found children to use th is type of 
reasoning frequently (Eisenberg, personal communication). The utilization of this 
type of orientation is clearly dependent upon the situation presented to  the child, 
though. As the data suggest, a responsibility orientation is most likely to  occur if 
the protagonist behaves as a causal agent in a manner discrepant w ith  the child 's 
expectations. This type of situation is prevalent w ith in  children's daily lives: Mary 
was supposed to wear sneakers for a field trip but did not and now her feet hurt; 
Johnny should not have been touching the sculpture in the library, and now it is 
broken. These scenarios being prevalent, a responsibility orientation deserves 
empirical attention and understanding as a valid prosocial moral reasoning 
subcategory in its own right.
Despite striking sim ilarities in reasoning, differences between younger and 
older children's social-cognitive skills can be seen in their reports of w hy they 
would or would not be willing to  help another. All of these differences concerned 
fifth-grade children's greater utilization of certain types of orientations. Previously 
mentioned were the increases in the use of responsibility orientation and role- 
taking. As well, fifth-grade children employed more considerations of future 
reciprocity and the context of the need. Each of these orientations reflects an 
ability to  attend to features not immediately present w ith in  the physical 
environment. This reflects an increased ability not to  be bound by visual
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perceptions. This is a difference in quantity, though, not quality. First-grade 
children did report abstract types of orientations such as stereotyped reasonings of 
w ha t good or bad people would do, how much the other person m ight like her or 
him if she or he helped, and the other person's responsibility for the situation. The 
younger child is beginning to  attend to more abstract considerations, therefore, and 
w ill be able to  do so increasingly over the next several years.
Conclusion
Consistent w ith  Piaget's (1954) claims, younger and older children differed 
in their reliance on social-cognitive skills in their helping decisions. Younger children 
were found to  participate in abstract social cognitions, such as making causal 
attributions, but did not apply these to  their helping decisions. Older children both 
made and utilized these cognitions. Consistent w ith  recent emphases w ith in  social- 
cognitive development (Flavell et a/., 1993), however, these differences can be 
seen as differences in quantity and not in quality. Both younger and older children 
predominantly attended to immediate, perceptible needs in their helping decisions. 
As w ell, although first-grade children failed to manipulate their perceptions of 
causality and imagining how they would feel in the other's situation in their 
w illingness to  help, they did display the ability to  associate abstract considerations 
w ith  their m otivations for helping.
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Table 1
Mean Self-Report of Helping Response as a Function of the Participant's Grade,
Causa! Condition, and Directions to Role-take: Schultz & Shaver (1995)
Causally
Controllable
Situation
Causally
Uncontrollable
Situation
Not Role- 
directed taking
Not
directed
Role-
taking
First-grade: 4 .93  5.00 
(.27) (.00) 
n = 14
4.80
(.56)
4.87
(.35)
/7 = 1 5
Fifth-grade: 4 .06  4 .56 
(.77) (.72) 
n = 16
4.79
(.64)
4.71
(.47)
n =  14
Note. Standard deviations appear in the parentheses.
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Table 2
Mean Self-Report of Willingness to Help as a Function of the Child's Grade, Causal
Condition, and Directions to Role-take
Causally
Controllable
Situation
Causally
Uncontrollable
Situation
Not Role- 
directed taking
Not Role- 
directed taking
First-grade: 2 .94 3.10 
(1.30) (1.60) 
/7 = 48
3.22 3.09 
(1.46) (1.44) 
a? = 46
Fifth-grade: 2.31 2.91 
(0.96) (1.12) 
a? = 35
3.06 3 .44  
(1.18) (1.13) 
/? = 34
Note. Standard deviations appear in the parentheses.
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Table 3
Mean Self-Report of Perceived Controllability as a Function of the Child's Grade,
Causa/  Condition, and Directions to Ro/e-take
Causally Causally
Controllable Uncontrollable
Situation Situation
Not Role- Not Role-
directed taking directed taking
First-grade: 3.42 2.98
(1.43) (1.55)
n — 48
2 .64 3 .04
(1.37) (1.49)
/? = 45
Fifth-grade: 4.49 4.11
(0.82) (1.11)
A7 = 35
3.56 4 .06
(1.28) (1.18)
n = 34
Note. Standard deviations appear in the parentheses.
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Table 4
Correlations between Perceived Controllability, Sympathy, Willingness to Help, and 
Desire to Keep Follow ing the First S tory as a Function o f  the Child's Grade
Perceived
Controllability Sympathy
Willingness 
to  Help
First-Grade:
Sympathy .02
W illingness to Help .20 .44*
Desire to  Keep -.03 -.3 6 * -.6 4 *
n = 94
Fifth-Grade:
Sympathy -.24
Willingness to  Help -.22 .58*
Desire to  Keep .04 -.3 6 * -.41 *
n = 69
* p < .001
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Table 5
Mean Self-Report o f  Sympathy as a Function o f the Child's Grade, Causal 
Condition, and Question Order
Causally
Controllable
Situation
Causally
Uncontrollable
Situation
Order Order Order Order
One Two One Two
First-grade: 3.81 3.00 3.41 3.75
n = 2 4 n = 2 4 n = 22 /? = 24
Fifth-grade: 2.53 2.25 2.97 3.47
a? = 19 n =  16 n = M n = M
Note. Order One contains the perceived contro llability measure prior to  the 
sym pathy measure. Order Tw o does not. The Mean Squared Error terms 
(MSe) for the distributions are 2.09 for Between-Subjects Effects and 1.10 
for W ithin-Subjects Effects.
Children's Decisions to Help 51
Table 6
Mean Self-Report o f Prosocial M otivation
1 st-grade 5th-grade
Category Girls Boys Girls Boys MSe
M agical Vie w  o f A u tho rity 4.09 4 .30 4 .14 4.22 1.09
Hedonistic Reasoning 18.43 18.13 18.44 19.14 24.92
Pragmatic Gain to Self 9.87 9.19 9.42 8.71 17.79
Direct Reciprocity 4 .00 4 .04 4.29 4.71 .92
A ffectiona l Relationship 4 .55 4.89 4.73 5.71 4.43
Nonhedonistic Pragmatism 4.47 4.38 4 .44 4.21 1.80
Concern fo r O thers ' Needs 16.68 14.77 16.73 15.64 23.93
Physical Needs 6.09 5.15 5.42 5.21 7.56
Psychological Needs 5.92 4 .64 5.22 4.71 5.64
Context of Need 4.68 4.98 6.10 5.71 6.03
Concern w ith  O thers' Humanness 4.00 4.00 4 .44 4.21 1.30
Stereotyped Reasoning 13.36 12.60 13.02 12.50 6.23
Good/Bad Person 5.36 4.51 4.78 4 .50 5.24
M ajority Behavior 4 .00 4.09 4 .15 4 .00 .17
Others and Their Roles 4 .00 4 .00 4 .10 4 .00 .10
A ppro va I/In terpersona! Orien ta tion 4.38 4.13 4 .24 4 .50 1.60
Responsibility Orien ta tion 4.30 5.70 6.59 8.07 10.50
Overt Em pa t hie Orientation 8.43 8.55 9.46 9 .00 6.30
Sympathetic Orientation 4.30 4.51 4 .44 4 .43 2.48
Role Taking 4.13 4 .04 5.02 4.57 3.26
Internalized A ffe c t 8.30 8.38 8 .44 8.00 1.67
Positive A ffec t: Conseq. 4 .14 4.09 4.29 4 .00 .95
Positive A ffec t: Self-respect 4 .17 4.30 4.15 4.00 .71
A bstracted  Types o f Reasoning 12.55 12.38 12.49 12.36 1.72
Internalized Laws, Norms 4.38 4.26 4.20 4.21 1.03
Concern for Rights 4.09 4.00 4.1 5 4 .14 .32
Condition of Society 4.09 4.13 4.15 4 .00 .44
Note. Category names appear in italics, and subcategories are indented.
Five categories-M agical V iew of Authority, Nonhedonistic Pragmatism, 
Concern w ith  Humanness, Approval/Interpersonal Orientation, and 
Responsibility O rientation-are both a category and a lone subcategory w ith in  
tha t category.
Children's Decisions to  Help 52
Appendix A 
Permission Form
Hello. I am a graduate student in psychology at the College of W illiam & 
Mary. Dr. Kelly Shaver and I are researching children's helping behaviors. We are 
looking to  see if the fo llow ing tw o  factors influence a child 's decision to  help 
another: 1) whether or not the person who needs help is at fau lt for her or his need, 
and 2) whether or not the child who could help imagines how the person w ho 
needs help is feeling. We are asking for your permission to let your child participate 
in our study.
Your child w ill be read tw o  short stories depicting common school-related 
situations (e.g., a child missing a pen). Your child then w ill be asked several 
questions concerning the child 's "at-fau ltness" for the situation, feelings the child in 
the story and your child as an observer have, and your child 's response to the 
situation. Your child 's participation w ill take no more than ten minutes from her or 
his in-class tim e.
Preceding the stories and questions I w ill explain to  each child tha t her or his 
answers w ill not a ffec t their grades for class and, in fact, w ill never be known to 
anyone except myself and Dr. Shaver; their answers w ill remain anonymous. 
Children w ill also be told tha t if for any reason they w ant to discontinue 
participation in the study once it has started, the study w ill stop.
Both the College of W illiam & Mary and the W illiamsburg-James C ity County 
Public Schools have approved this study. I would be happy to speak w ith  you if 
you have any questions or concerns about the study. My office phone number is 
221 -3891 , and my home phone number is 565-31 43. If you would like to  receive 
the results of the study, please w rite  your name and address below.
Thank you,
David Schultz
(please tear at line and keep above description)
I give permission for my child to  participate in David Schultz' 
and Dr. Kelly Shaver's study of helping behavior
I do not give permission for my child to participate
child 's signature parent or guardian's signature date
child 's name parent or guardian's name
Please send results to  the fo llow ing address:
PLEASE RETURN FORM TO YOUR CHILD'S TEACHER BY FEBRUARY 4th
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Appendix B 
Adapted Version of Eisenberg-Berg's (1979)
Prosocial Moral Reasoning Categories
1. Obsessive and/or m agical view o f authoritiy  and/or punishments.
Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued 
in their own right. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness 
regardless of human values and needs. Example: " If he d idn 't help, someone would 
find out and punish him ."
2. Hedonistic reasoning.
(a) Pragmatic, hedonistic gain to the se lf: Orientation to  gain for oneself 
(besides gain resulting from direct reciprocity). Example: "She w ou ldn 't help 
because she'd w an t to go to the party."
(b) Direct reciprocity. Orientation to personal gain due to direct reciprocity 
(or lack of it) from the recipient of an act. Example: "She'd help because they'd 
give her food the next time she needed it."
{c) A ffec tiona l relationship: Individuals' identifications w ith  another, their 
liking for the other, and the other's relation to one's own needs are important 
considerations in the individual's moral reasoning. Example: "She'd share because 
she'd probably have friends in the to w n ."
3. Nonhedonistic pragmatism.
Orientation to practical concerns that are not d irectly related to either selfish 
considerations or the other's need. Example: "I'd  help because I'm strong."
4. Concern fo r o thers ' needs (needs-oriented reasoning).
(a) Concern fo r o thers ' physical and m ateria! needs: Orientation to the 
physical and material needs of the other person. Examples: "He needs blood," or 
"She's hurt."
(b) Concern fo r o thers ' psychological needs: Orientation to the psychological 
needs and affective states of the other person. Example: "They'd be happy if they 
had food."
(c) Concern fo r the context o f the need: Orientation to  the context of the 
other's need. Example: " It may be her/his favorite card," or "The papers may be 
im portant."
5. Reference to and concern w ith humanness.
Orientation to  the fact that the other is human, living, a person. Example: 
"He'd help because "they 're  human," or "they are people, too ."
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6 . Stereotyped reasoning.
(a) Stereotypes o f a good or bad person: Orientation to  stereotyped images 
of a good or bad person. Example: A child would help because " it 's  n ice."
(b) Stereotyped images o f m ajority behavior: Orientation to  "natura l" 
behavior and w hat most people would do. Example: " It 's  only natural to  help."
(c) Stereotyped images o f  others and their roles: Orientation to  stereotyped 
image of others and w hat others do. Example: "I'd  help because farmers are nice 
people."
7. Approva l and interpersonal orientation.
Orientation to  others' approval and acceptance in deciding w hat is the 
correct behavior. Example: "They'd like her if she helped."
8. Responsibility Orientation.
Orientation to  the other's responsibility in her/his cause of need. Examples:
"I w ou ldn 't need to  help her/him if s/he hadn't tried to  skip the step," or " It was 
her/his fau lt."
9. Overt empathic orientations.
(a) Sym pathetic orientation: Expression of sym pathetic concern and caring 
for others. Examples: "He would feel sorry for them ," or "She'd be concerned."
(b) Role taking: The individual takes the perspective of the other and 
exp lic itly  uses this perspective in personal reasoning. Examples: "I'm  trying to put 
myself in her shoes," or "She'd know how it feels."
10. Internalized a ffect.
(a) Simple internalized positive a ffe c t and positive a ffe c t re lated to 
consequences: The individual simply states that he or she would "feel good" as a 
result of a particular course of action w ithou t giving a reason, or says tha t the 
consequences of his or her act for the other person would inspire good feelings.
The a ffec t must be used in a context tha t appears internalized. Example: "She'd 
help because seeing the villagers fed would make her feel good."
(b) Internalized positive a ffe c t from  self-respect and living up to one's  
values: Orientation to  feeling good as the result of living up to internalized values. 
Example: "I'd  feel good knowing that I had lived up to my principles."
(c) Internalized negative a ffe c t over consequences o f behavior: Concern w ith  
feeling bad or guilty due to  the consequences of an act. Example: "She would feel 
guilty because the girl was hurt."
(d) Internalized negative a ffe c t due to loss o f self-respect and/or no t living up 
to one's values: Orientation to feeling bad as the result of not living up to  
internalized values. Example: "He'd th ink badly of himself if he d idn 't do the right 
th ing."
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11. Other abstract and/or internalized types o f reasoning.
(a) Internalized law, norm, and value orientation : Orientation to an 
internalized responsibility, duty, or need to  uphold the laws and accepted norms or 
values. Examples: "She has a duty to help needy others," or "He'd feel he had a 
responsibility to assist because of his values."
(b) Concern w ith  the rights o f others: Orientation to  protecting individual 
rights and preventing injustices tha t violate another's rights. Example: "I'd  help 
because her right to  w alk down the street was being violated."
(c) Generalized reciprocity: Orientation to indirect reciprocity in a society 
(i.e., exchange tha t is not one-to-one but eventually benefits all). Example: "If 
everyone helps one another, w e'd  all be better o ff."
(d) Concern w ith  the condition o f society: Orientation to  improving the 
society or com m unity as a whole. Example: " If everyone helps, society would be a 
lot better."
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Appendix C 
Data
The fo llow ing is a description of the variable names appearing on the succeeding 
page's data list:
The firs t variable (subject) is simply the number of the subject as she or he was 
entered into the SPSS data file.
The next eight variables (gender through school) are independent variables.
Gender, grade, race, and school refer to  demographic information about the subject. 
Causal, question, story, and tester refer to  experimental manipulations. Causal 
refers to  whether the stories the subject heard were both controllable (controll) by 
the protagonist or uncontrollable (uncontro). Question refers to  whether the firs t 
question asked was the perceived controllability measure (Stopped) or the 
sym pathy measure (Sorry?). Story refers to whether the story concerning another 
child who needs money (cafteria) or the story concerning a lost drawing (classrom) 
came firs t. Tester refers to whether the subject was tested by the research 
assistant (Terence) or the primary researcher (David).
The next eight variables (sorry l through stopped2) are dependent variables 
measured by the five increasingly large stacks of checkers. Descriptions of the 
particular questions each of these variables refers to can be found in the Method 
section. The 1 or 2 at the end of each variable name refers to  whether the 
measure was taken fo llow ing the firs t or second story.
The next fo rty -tw o  variables are the prosocial reasoning dependent variables. 
Descriptions of each variable can be found in Appendix B. The 1 or 2 at the end of 
each variable name refers to whether the measure was taken fo llow ing the firs t or 
second story.
The tw en ty-e igh t compute statem ents create new prosocial reasoning dependent 
variables. Each subject's prosocial reasoning scores fo llow ing the tw o  stories are 
averaged to determine an individual score for each subject for each subcategory.
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data list fixed/subject 1-3 gender 4 grade 5 race 6 causal 7
question 8 story 9 tester 10 school 11 sorryl 12 helpl 13 
keepl 14 stoppedl 15 sorry2 16 help2 17 keep2 18 stopped2 19 
mgcll 20 prgmtcl 21 rcprctyl 22 affctnll 23 nnhdnstl 24 
physcll 25 psychlgl 26 cntxtll 27 hmnnssl 28 gdprsnl 29 
mjrtyl 30 othrsrll 31 apprvll 32 rspnsbll 33 sympthtl 34 
rltkngl 35 pscnsqnl 36 slfrspcl 37 lwnrml 38 rghtsl 39 mgcl2 
40 cndtnl 41 prgmtc2 42 rcprcty2 43 affctnl2 44 nnhdnst2 45 
physcl2 46 psychlg2 47 cntxtl2 48 hmnnss2 49 gdprsn2 50 
mjrty2 51 othrsrl2 52 apprvl2 53 rspnsbl2 54 symptht2 55 
rltkng2 56 pscnsqn2 57 slfrspc2 58 lwnrm2 59 rghts2 60 
cndtn2 61.
value labels gender 1 'females' 2 'males'/grade 1 'first' 2 'fifth'
/race 1 'Caucsian' 2 'Afr-Amer' 3 'Hispanic'/causal 1 'controll 
2 'uncontro' /question 1 'Stopped' 2 'Sorry?'/story 1 'cafteria 
2 'classrom' /tester 1 'Terence' 2 'David'/school 1 'Rwls-Brd'
2 'Montague'.
variable labels grade 'student grade' race 'racial identity' 
causal 'control of protgnist' question 'first question' 
story 'first story' school 'school of student' sorryl 'sorrow fi 
protgnist' helpl 'desire to help' keepl 'personal sacrifice' 
stoppedl 'prceived cntrllablty' sorry2 'sorrow for protgnist' 
help2 'desire to help' keep2 'personal sacrifice' 
stopped2 'prceived cntrllablty'. 
begin data.
001221111112155342 5141111111111111111111111111111111411111111 
0021211221132 551255141111111411111111111141111111421111112111 
0032211121143353255113411111111211111111131111421111112111111 
0041211111132142 534131111131111111111111111111241111111111111 
0051211121144344445121111111221111122111121112111111111111111 
0062211211121454422111111111111141111111111111141111141111111 
007211211115 5555 555131111141111111111211111132111111111111111 
0082112211152524111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
0092112221154534155111111111331111113311141111111111111111111 
0102111121111511151141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
0112111111112 555432141111111111112111111111113421111112111111 
0122111221154152245112411111111111111111141111111111141111111 
0132212111133423344111114131111111111111141111241111111111111 
0142212221145235435111411111111111111111111113131111111411111 
0151212221121513423131111141111111111111121114211111111111111 
0162212211122353322131111111111111111211121111111111111111111 
0172211111133453345141111111111111111111111111141111111111111 
0181212111133343345111113131111111111111141111111111111111111 
0192212121143233232141411111111111111111114111111111111111111 
0201212121134422155131111111111321111111111111121111111111111 
0212131121144134453111141111111111111111141111111111111111111 
0221112111152515155111111111411111111111111111111411111111111 
0231112211123313451141111111111111111111111113111111111111111 
0242121111141524543111111111111111111311111111111111111111111 
0251111121142531155141111111111131111111111111411111111111111 
0261111221155353343141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
0272111211143324333111114121111111111111121111111111111111111 
0282112111145234331111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
0291211211123452344111111111111114111111141111111111111111111 
0301211111132352245111111111111141111111111111111111141111111 
0311221221142 451355141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
0321212211144344431141113111111111111111111111131111111111111 
0331211211144144423111111131111111111111111131131111111111111 
0341112111142513554111114131111111111111141111111111111111111 
0352112211142555354111111131111111111111111111411111112111111 
0361112121153234233111111111111111111111111111411111112111111 
0372112221144333342111111111211111111111111111111411111111111
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0382111211132343214111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
0392111221122533154141111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
0401111111112551155141111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
0412112121142414455111111111111114114111141111111111111111111 
0421212221144155513111111441111111111111111111111111111111221 
0431212211142555455111111111111141111111141111111111131111111 
0441212121135443455141411111111111111111113141111111111111111 
0451212111155323432141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
0461211121132231154111111111111141111111111132121111111111111 
0472211221132 541151111121131111141111211141111111111111111111 
0482212221123452245111431111111141111111111111141111111111111 
0492112211141234321111411111111111111111111111111111141111111 
0501111211132 524341111111111111141111111111111411111111111111 
0511111211121525513141111111111111111111111311111111411111111 
0522111121154534452111111111111111111111111114111111111111111 
0531112221155515551131113111111111111311121113111111111111311 
0542121221155111151111411111111111111111141111111111111111111 
0552112121144314343141111111111111111111111111111311111113111 
0562112221143213232111111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
0572112111142555533111111111111114111111111111111111114111111 
0582111111152434541111113111211111111211111111141111111111111 
0591121111253555533111111111111114111111141111111111111111111 
0601111211232453355141111111111111111111111111411111111111111 
0612112211245132543111111141111111111111111111111111411111111 
06211111212 52 441151111111111311111112111141111111111111111111 
0632112211211541152111111111111111211111111111111111141111111 
0642122121245211355111131111111111111111141111111111111111111 
0651112221254222412111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
0661111111221513151141111111311111111111311111121311111111111 
0671111211232423242141111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
0682112221245144324211113111111121111111111114111111111111111 
0691212211254352425111411111111111111111131111411111111111111 
0701212111212431254141111111111141111111111111111111131111111 
0711211111233432243132111111111111111111111111111121111112311 
0721211211222431424131111111111141111111211111311111141111111 
0732212111244535 545111411111111111111111111111111111141111111 
0742232211243551155141111111111141111111141111111111113111111 
0752211111211453243141111111111141111111111111111111141111111 
07622111112122 52435111111111111141111111131111131411111111111 
0771111121144254525111111411111111111111111111111411111111111 
0782111211132555355111111111111141111111111111111111141111111 
0791112221134533345111111411111111111111131114111111111111111 
0801121221255231252111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
0811111211213531355141111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
0821211121222441445111111111111141111111111111111111111111111 
0831211221232352244411111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
0841212121221551155111111311111411111111141111111111111111111 
0852212221232533355111111111111111111131141111111111111111111 
0861212221232424325111111111111111111211141111111111111111111 
0872212221232344324144411111111111111111141111411111111111111 
0882241221233242435411111111411111111111111111111111141111111 
0891212211243323435141111111111111111111141111141111111111111 
0901212111252552524111114131111111111111111111311111111111111 
091121121121255442 5141111141111111111111111111141111111111111 
0922111112211525345111111111111141111111141131111111111111111 
0931112212244534554111114111111111111111111111111411111111111 
09412211222332 54525111111114111111411111111111414111111411111 
0951112222234242252141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
09612111122332 52323141114141111121111111141111111411121111111 
0971112222254234433111131411111111111111141114111111111111111 
0982121112232513544111411111111111111111131111111111111111111 
0992112222245234253411111131111131111111141111111111111111111
Children's Decisions to  Help
1001112222254113424111111111411111111111111111111111111111111 
1011111112244324531111111111111411111111141111111111111111111 
1022111212223551545141111111111141111111111411141111111111111 
1032211212223431232131114111111111111111141111141111111111111 
1041112122252544455141111141111111111111141411411111111111111 
1051211212233354423144111111111111131111111111114111111141111 
1061111122255135511121411111111111111111131114111111111111111 
1071112222255155513111111131411111111111111114111411111111111 
10811112222545 53153141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
1091121222224151541111141131111111111311141111111111111111111 
1101111122254125435111111411111111111111111114111111111111111 
1112112122223432153141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
1122221121255152255111411111111111111111111111111111141111111 
11322112112115 52245141111111111111111111111111114111114111111 
1142211221213451345141111111111141111111111111111111141111111 
1152212 22124512 5323121111111111141111111111111111111131111111 
1161211121211551155111411111111111111111111111111111141111111 
1171211221233552345131411111111111111111141111111111121111111 
1181212221234254425111111111111141111111141111111111111111111 
1191212111223322 344141111111311111111111141111111111141411111 
1202121122254454355111411111111111111111141111111111141111111 
1212111112253125514141111121111141111111111113131111131111111 
12221112122345 54315141111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
12311112222 55151151111111311311111111111141111111111411111111 
1241122122245245454111411111111111111111141114111111111111111 
1251111112242435413141111111111111111111111111111111111411111 
12 62121212233544153341111111111111111111441111111111111111111 
12 721111222 52 542151141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
1281112112232553142141114111111111111111141111411111111111111 
1291211112221542223111114111111141111111331114111111111111111 
1301212122223455433111111111111141111111111114111111114111111 
1312232112244533444113112111111111311111111111411111121411111 
1322222212234553455141114111211111111111141113111111111111111 
1331212122222241412141111111111111111111111133131111111111111 
13412122122 54533 554141411111111114411111141111141111111411111 
1352112112211541155141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
1362112212224525555141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
13711222122 52534151141111111111111111131141311111111111111111 
13811121222 53423231141111111111111114111141114111111111111111 
1392111122255155151211111111311111111111141111111111141111111 
1402111212213551554141111111111111111111141111411111111111111 
1412121221241521151141111111111111111111111111111111131111111 
1421112211231522233111114411111111111111111111141111111111111 
1432111221245155514111111411211111111111111114411111111111111 
1442112112231515454141114111111141111111141111131111111111111 
1451112112241414341141111111111111111211141111111111111111111 
1461112122222432152141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
1472212121231554445111111111111141111111111111111111141111111 
1482211121221352244111111111111141111111111111111111141111111 
1492212121223432344411111111111411111111141411111111111111111 
1501211221222551245111111411111111411111131111111111141111111 
1512221121242524423141111111111111111211131114111111111111111 
1521111112253525514321111111111111111311111111111111111141111 
1532112222255145515111411111111111111111141114111111111111111 
1541122122213212 553141111111111111111111111113411111112111111 
1552112122221531155141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
1562122112235422421141111111111111111111141111111111111131111 
1571111212242533342141111111111111111111141111111111111111111 
1581112112242 513251141111111111113111111141141411111111111111 
15911111212 542 55523111114141111111111111111114111111111111111 
1601111221232322342141141111111111111111141111111411111111111 
16111 2221245114341111111411111131111111141113211111111111111
Children's Decisions to  Help
compute lwnrm = 
compute rghts = 
compute cndtn =
* 2 .
* 2 .
* 2  . 
* 2 .
* 2 . 
* 2 .
1621232112252325555111114111211111111131141111341111111111111 
1631211112222452334141111111113141111111111111411411111411111 
end data.
compute mgcl = (mgcll + mgcl2)*2. 
compute prgmtc = (prgmtcl + prgmtc2)* 2 . 
compute rcprcty = (rcprctyl + rcprcty2)*2. 
compute affctnl = (affctnll + affctnl2)*2. 
compute nnhdnst = (nnhdnstl + nnhdnst2)*2. 
compute physcl = (physcll + physcl2)*2 
compute psychlg = (psychlgl + psychlg2 
compute cntxtl = (cntxtll + cntxtl2)*2 
compute hmnnss = (hmnnssl + hmnnss2)*2 
compute gdprsn = (gdprsnl + gdprsn2)*2 
compute mjrty = (mjrtyl + mjrty2)*2. 
compute othrsrl = (othrsrll + othrsrl2 
compute apprvl = (apprvll + apprvl2)*2 
compute rspnsbl = (rspnsbll + rspnsbl2 
compute symptht = (sympthtl + symptht2 
compute rltkng = (rltkngl + rltkng2)*2 
compute pscnsqn = (pscnsqnl + pscnsqn2 
compute slfrspc = (slfrspcl + slfrspc2 
(lwnrml + lwnrm2)*2.
(rghtsl + rghts2)*2.
(cndtnl + cndtn2)*2. 
compute hdnstc = prgmtc + rcprcty + affctnl. 
compute needs = physcl + psychlg + cntxtl. 
compute strtypd = gdprsn + mjrty + othrsrl. 
compute empathic = symptht + rltkng. 
compute affect = pscnsqn + slfrspc. 
compute abstract = lwnrm + rghts + cndtn. 
variable labels mgcl 'obsessve magcal view'
prgmtc 'prgmtic hdnistc gain' rcprcty 'direct reciprocity'
affctnl 'affctionl reltionshp' nnhdnst 'nonhdnistic prgmtism'
physcl 'physical needs' psychlg 'psychological needs'
cntxtl 'context of need' hmnnss 'others hummanness'
gdprsn 'stereotype of good' mjrty 'streotype of majrity'
othrsrl 'stereotype of role' apprvl 'approval orientation'
rspnsbl 'rspnsblty orienttion' symptht 'sympthtc orientation'
rltkng 'role taking' pscnsqn 'pos affct— cnsquencs'
slfrspc 'pos affct— slf rspct' lwnrm 'laws or norms'
rghts 'others rights' cndtn 'condition of humnity'
hdnstc 'hedonistic needs' needs 'others needs'
strtypd 'stereotyped reasning' empathic 'overt empathic'
affect 'internalized affect' abstract 'abstract rules or norms'.
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Appendix D 
MANOVA for Willingness to Help
The following is the SPSS printout of the 2 X 2 X 2  (Grade X Causal 
Condition X Role-Taking) analysis of variance (ANOVA) examining 
children's willingness to help:
manova helpl help2 by grade (1/2) causal (1/2)/wsfactors roletake (2) 
/omeans/design.
163 cases accepted.
0 cases rejected because of out-of-range factor values.
0 cases rejected because of missing data.
4 non-empty cells.
1 design will be processed.
Cell Means and Standard Deviations
Variable .. HELP1 
FACTOR CODE
desire to help
Mean Stdi Dev. N
GRADE 
CAUSAL 
CAUSAL 
GRADE 
CAUSAL 
CAUSAL 
For entire sample
Variable .. HELP2 
FACTOR
first
controll
uncontro
fifth
controll
uncontro
CODE
2.938 
3.196
2.314
3.059
2.902
desire to help
1.295
1.455
.963 
1.179 
1.287
Mean Std. Dev.
48
46
35
34
163
N
GRADE 
CAUSAL 
CAUSAL 
GRADE 
CAUSAL 
CAUSAL 
For entire sample
first
controll
uncontro
fifth
controll
uncontro
3. 104 
3.043
2.914 
3.441 
3.117
1. 601 
1.460
1.121 
1.133 
1.376
48
46
35
34
163
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.
Tests of Significance for T1 using UNIQUE sums of squares
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F
WITHIN CELLS 347.48 159 2 .19
CONSTANT 2866.32 1 2866.32 1311.58 .000
GRADE 1. 52 1 1. 52 . 69 .406
CAUSAL 10. 73 1 10. 73 4.91 .028
GRADE BY CAUSAL 5 .74 1 5.74 2.62 . 107
?ests involving 'ROLETAKE' Within-Subject Effect.
Tests of Significance for T2 using UNIQUE sums of squares
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F
WITHIN CELLS 205.52 159 1.29
ROLETAKE 4.94 1 4.94 3.82 .052
GRADE BY ROLETAKE 4. 66 1 4. 66 3.60 .059
CAUSAL BY ROLETAKE 1.43 1 1.43 1.11 .294
GRADE BY CAUSAL BY ROLETAKE .05 1 . 05 . 04 .843
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